U.S.-Israeli Defense Pact: How to Ensure That Its Advantages Outweigh Its
Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser
The idea of a defense pact between Israel and the United
States has already been considered several times in the past and rejected. Both
sides are cautious about making undesirable commitments that would limit their
freedom of action and require them to act militarily in contexts that are not
viewed as vital by their respective populations. It was also felt that the level
of security and diplomatic cooperation between the two sides is very high in any
case, and the advantages of such a pact would not justify the changes it would
entail in Israelís approach to security. Israel has reserved the right of
nonintervention in conflicts that do not directly affect Israel, preserving its
independent decision-making when it comes to using its power, and, above all,
upholding the principle that Israel should be able to defend itself by itself.
Undoubtedly, the renewed interest in the subject, which is
seemingly pragmatic and more realistic than in the past, stemmed from political
motives of helping Netanyahu and Trump muster domestic support. At the same
time, the idea is worth considering. Ultimately, God is in the details, and if
it turns out to be possible to reap the advantages and minimize the risks
entailed by such a measure, then it could be of benefit to Israelís security.
The tight security cooperation between the two countries
stems from ideological affinity, shared interests, and their mutual commitments
to each otherís security (while, of course, clearly distinguishing between
their respective capabilities and status). The bilateral relationship is also
grounded in official agreements and undertakings (such as the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, which ensures U.S. military and other aid to Israel, and the
agreement on setting up a joint Strategic Policy Planning Group [SPPG] between
Barak and Clinton in 1999).
Nevertheless, to date, Israelís expectations of the
United States in the security domain have gone unfulfilled in a large number of
cases. According to the unwritten understandings between the sides, Israel is
supposed to deal with threats within its own immediate environment while relying
on U.S. assistance in intelligence, equipment, and resources, and the United
States is supposed to prevent, with Israeli help, the emergence of strategic
threats to Israel and to the United States from the second and the third tier.
Although these understandings have been implemented in a large number of cases,
at several critical junctures the United States has decided to prefer other
interests over Israelís security needs, allowed the threats to its security to
intensify, and forced it to stretch its capabilities to the limit, with Israel
devoting huge budgets and other resources to its defense at the expense of other
important issues. (Some notable examples out of many are the delay of the
airlift in the Yom Kippur War, Israelís attacks on the Iraqi and Syrian
nuclear reactors, the lack of resolute U.S. action to thwart Iranís missile
project in the 1990s, and, above all, Washingtonís support of the nuclear
agreement with Iran).
Second, todayís political and security circumstances
differ considerably from those in whose context the idea of a pact was
contemplated in the past. The intensity and the complexity of the threats have
significantly increased, and in light of Iranís frenetic activity throughout
the region (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen), the distinction between near
and distant threats has eroded. At the same time, the degree to which the two
leaderships see eye-to-eye with regard to identifying the threats, and
determining objectives and ways of contending with them, is unprecedented. That
holds true both for the nuclear and regional threat posed by the Islamic regime
in Iran and for the struggle against radical Sunni Islam in its various forms.
It also holds true in the Palestinian context, as preparations are being
completed to publicize the ďTrump planĒ and efforts continue to convince the
Palestinians to adopt a narrative that is linked to reality, which would enable
progress in the peace process. The change that has occurred in the American
perception and policy also makes it possible to create a regional framework for
a U.S.-Israeli defense pact that would not have been feasible in the past.
Thus, a U.S.-Israeli defense pact could help promote the
two statesí common goals Ė most of all, deterring Iran and curbing its
activity by making it clear to Tehran that aggression against Israel is
tantamount to aggression against the United States and would prompt harsh
American countermeasures. Such a pact could also further deepen the intelligence
and operational cooperation between the sides. (It is indeed very extensive even
today since the upgrading of Israelís status in 2014 to that of a special
strategic partner Ė a status held exclusively by Israel. Previously it was a
non-NATO special ally, a status equal to that of several other countries
including Arab countries). A pact could also further improve the quality of the
technologies and the military equipment that the United States provides to
Israel. Israel, in any case, puts no limits on its security cooperation with the
United States and would not have to alter its approach in that regard.
At the same time, the proper wording of such a pact would
have to leave both sides room for decision-making and initiatives. It should
require joint consultations, not necessarily automatic responses to aggression
against either country or their common vital interests. Such a pact must
preserve both sidesí independence of decision-making in case of disagreement
about a joint action; reinforce the principle that Israel must continue to be
capable of defending itself by itself, to the extent possible; and it must not
put new limits on Israelís ability to develop ties with other important states
such as China and Russia. Incorporating such a pact into a regional framework
could, as noted, add to its advantages.
In conclusion, the answer to the question of whether a
defense pact with the United States is good for Israel depends more on its
contents than on its name or its immediate political context, and the talks on
the details are still before us (after a new Israeli government is in place).
American goodwill could help in crafting a text that would justify such a pact,
and at present, it appears that such goodwill exists in the White House. At the
same time, Israel should not opt for such a pact at any price.