Bring
Back Containment, and End the Iran Deal
By Robert
Joseph
The Weekly
Standard
August
15,
2017
The
Trump administration is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward
Iran. There is no doubt top national security officials view the Islamic
Republic as a major threat, both in terms of regional instability and
proliferation. This recognition represents the principal difference from the
previous administration and a welcome step forward. One likely outcome will be a
stronger U.S.-led effort to counter Iran’s expanding presence, particularly in
Syria and Iraq. The formation of an Arab alliance against Islamic terrorism,
announced when Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia, signaled a move toward a more
effective regional stance.
But
there is little to suggest that, beyond an attempt to roll back Tehran’s
external adventurism, there will be a fundamental change in U.S. policy. Press
reports indicate that the usual interagency battle lines are being
drawn—between those who advocate regime change and those who would continue
past policies.
The
main indicator of the direction of Iran policy will be the president’s
decision on the future of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Candidate
Trump’s stance on the nuclear deal during the campaign was clear: The JCPOA
was a calamity for American security interests. Trump called it the worst
agreement ever negotiated and declared in the spring of 2016: “My number-one
priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”
But
much seems to have changed since he took office. His secretaries of state and
defense have both reportedly urged him to stick with the deal—while admitting
Iran remains the chief sponsor of international terrorism and the greatest
threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. Most telling are the
administration’s two declarations to Congress that Iran is in compliance with
the agreement. That might be true only in a very narrow, technical sense. Iran
may now be complying with those terms of the agreement monitored by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, but that does not mean Tehran has stopped
work on nuclear weapons. Just recall that the potential military activities
identified by the IAEA in November 2011 were swept under the rug and that the
supreme leader has explicitly ruled out inspections of the facilities that were
the suspected sites of many of those activities.
Iran
continues aggressively to expand its offensive ballistic missile force, already
the largest and most dangerous in the region. The revelations recently made
public by National Council of Resistance of Iran make clear that the country’s
weapons programs, both nuclear and missile, are alive and well and moving
forward. Consistent with this conclusion, U.S. officials have assessed that Iran
has an active intercontinental ballistic missile program, for which the only
purpose is to deliver a nuclear warhead.
A
number of arguments for and against staying in the nuclear agreement are
presumably being considered in the administration review. The two most often
heard in favor of remaining are:
The
agreement provides some transparency to Iran’s nuclear program and slows it at
least temporarily. Better to have 5,000 centrifuges spinning than 12,000 or
19,000. Better to have quantitative and qualitative limits on low-enriched
uranium and limits on heavy water and the Arak reactor than not. But the issue
is how meaningful these limits are in the broader context of Iran’s nuclear
ambitions and at what cost.
Leaving
will lead to widespread criticism from the other parties to the deal. John Kerry
often raised the specter of the United States being isolated if Washington did
not go forward with the agreement.
As
for arguments in favor of withdrawal, five stand out:
The
flawed verification provisions of the JCPOA mean that we cannot verify that Iran
has stopped work on nuclear weapon design. If Tehran does not have a covert
program today, it would be the first time in decades.
The
premise of the deal is demonstratively false. Far from leading to a more
moderate Iran, the agreement has resulted in increased funding of international
terrorism and a further expansion of Iran’s external interventions. The irony
is that the misguided policies of the Obama administration have only
strengthened the regime in Tehran, providing it with the means to advance its
proliferation programs, foment disorder in neighboring countries, and brutalize
its own people—the first and foremost victims of the regime.
Staying
in the agreement undermines the U.S. ability to contain the broader threat by
providing legitimacy to an illegitimate regime and strengthening the Iranian
economy and thereby the regime. This undercuts the regional coalition to roll
back Iranian adventurism and military aggression.
The
JCPOA—in the form of an executive agreement reinforced by a U.N. Security
Council resolution—usurped the constitutional prerogative of the Senate,
which, under Article II, Section 2, has the power and responsibility to advise
and consent on all treaties. President Obama deliberately chose not to pursue a
treaty because he knew the Senate would reject it.
President
Trump will make the final decision on the nuclear agreement. If he takes the
country out, it will almost certainly be against the advice of his cabinet
members and the institutional national security complex in and out of
government. But this would nevertheless be the right decision: It is not in the
U.S. interest to remain in the JCPOA.