Inside Turkey’s Failed Coup:
What Happened? Why? What Next?
Soner Cagaptay and James F. Jeffrey
WINEP
July 22, 2016
SONER CAGAPTAY
For most people who were born in
Turkey or study the country, the most difficult image to see during last week's
events was Ankara -- a city that had not been attacked or occupied since the
fifteenth century -- being bombed by Turks. Ultimately, the July 15 plot proved
to be a counterfeit coup. Although it was meant to look like a full-fledged coup
carried out by the military's top brass, it was in fact a factional uprising
within the military. Only about 20 percent of the country's generals were
involved; they hoped to harness enough critical mass among top officers to
subsequently mount a full coup, but they lacked widespread support. Their only
significant backing came from the air force and gendarmerie -- there was no real
support in the army, which comprises 65 percent of the armed forces. In fact,
their nefarious plot began to unravel when the commander of the 1st Army went on
television and declared, "This is not a coup."
The plot failed in part because it was poorly conceived. For example, it was
carried out at 10:00 p.m. when everyone was out in the streets, instead of well
after midnight when coups are generally executed. When the plotters realized
that Turkish intelligence had discovered their plans, they launched the coup
prematurely, which led to its unraveling
The plan also failed because the forces supporting President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan were too powerful. An assassination attempt against him was, thankfully,
unsuccessful because intelligence informed him of the plot. He was also able to
connect with the masses and galvanize them to action. The plotters took over TRT,
a state-run television channel that is not among the country's most-watched
networks. Erdogan responded by going on CNN-Turk over FaceTime and calling on
his supporters to flood the streets. Meanwhile, the national police remained
loyal to him and prevented the gendarmerie from leaving their barracks, enabling
armed pro-government groups to outnumber pro-coup forces. Moreover, social media
was abuzz with anti-coup messaging, and the mobilization of pro-Erdogan masses
demonstrated the victory of the digital age over an analog coup. Ironically,
Erdogan was saved by the very social media outlets he has been trying to ban.
The coup would have been bad for Turks no matter how it turned out. To be sure,
a successful plot would have been worse -- Turkey would have become a more
oppressive country run by generals, perhaps even descending into civil war. Yet
even with an apparent Erdogan victory, Turkey will still become more oppressive.
In the wake of this attack against the constitutional order, the president now
has carte blanche to crack down on the opposition. Since 2003, he has built a
cult of personality as a kind of authoritarian underdog, portraying himself as a
victim who is forced to take action against those conspiring to undermine his
authority. Now this conspiracy theory has legs -- in the eyes of Erdogan and his
supporters, opposing the president really does mean plotting a coup.
In some respects, Erdogan's response to the plot will likely resemble the U.S.
response to al-Qaeda. Yet he will probably wind up casting too wide of a net,
targeting liberals, civil society institutions, and democratic opposition
factions that were not linked to the coup -- this despite the fact that all
Turkish political parties and media outlets, along with many NGOS and the TUSIAD
business lobby, stood against the plot from the beginning. (Although Erdogan has
perhaps recognized this loyalty -- the head of the main opposition party was
recently invited to appear on TRT for the first time in six years -- he still
maintains his divisive "us vs. them" rhetoric.)
Going forward, Erdogan will use this opportunity to expand his power, seeking to
become head of government in addition to his current capacity as head of state.
This would allow him to become the most powerful person in Turkey since Kemal
Ataturk. But even as the new Ataturk, he would only be embraced by half the
country, so the risk of domestic instability will be high in the coming months.
Turkish relations with the United States could become more complicated as well.
The two biggest bilateral issues will be the Gulen Movement and NATO membership.
On the first issue, Erdogan believes the movement -- whose leader, Turkish
Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen, lives in the United States as a permanent
resident -- is completely behind the coup plot. Ankara will therefore press hard
for his extradition, and Washington will need to give the request thorough and
swift consideration. At the same time, Erdogan must not link this issue to
military cooperation against the Islamic State -- if he tries to present the
United States with an ultimatum, it will backfire.
As for NATO, the current mood in Ankara is very dark, nervous, and angry, with
some even claiming that the United States was behind the coup because Gulen
lives there. Thus, for the first time in recent memory, some Turks are seriously
questioning their country's NATO membership. If Washington does not convince
Turkey of its commitment to cooperate on Gulen, Ankara could quickly pivot
toward Russia -- a sobering thought given that Erdogan is scheduled to meet with
Vladimir Putin the first week of August.
JAMES JEFFREY
By far, the number-one victor in
the aftermath of the coup attempt is Erdogan. He has gained enormous power
within the part of the population that supports him and achieved legendary
status by evading assassination. The steps he takes now will be motivated by a
dual desire to prevent additional conspiracies and further expand his control.
Three potential scenarios may help explain Erdogan's post-coup approach. First,
the Gulen Movement is widespread in the police and judiciary and may be just as
extensive throughout the bureaucracy -- it is difficult to determine the extent
of the cult-like, impenetrable network. Accordingly, the government might have a
real rationale for rounding up as many people as it has. A second alternative is
that the movement was involved in the coup, but the government is spreading its
net very wide in order to purge everyone who has opposed Erdogan. A third
scenario is that Gulen was not involved, and Erdogan simply views the coup
attempt as a "gift from heaven" (as he described it the day after)
that gives him the excuse he needed to purge the bureaucracy and expand his
power.
Whatever the case, Ankara's response will create major problems for relations
with the United States. Turkey is already a polarized society, and this split
will widen it further. Internal turbulence will drive down Turkey's economic
standing in the short term, and as rule of law and judiciary independence are
called into question, the economy's long-term prospects will suffer as well.
Human rights violations will further strain bilateral relations, and Washington
will be compelled to condemn Erdogan's violations of democratic freedoms.
Yet the situation would have been worse if the military power grab had
succeeded. Unlike the 1980 coup, even people who oppose Erdogan's government did
not want military intervention. Furthermore, half of the population strongly
supports him and would have resisted if the military had come to power. The
resulting scenario would have looked less like the 1980 coup and more like the
Syrian civil war.
So far, the Obama administration has handled the situation well, but every day
will bring new challenges. Turkey is important for regional stability and
international peace, but the U.S. government has limited options at the moment.
Washington will have to be very open and frank in publicly standing up for its
values, but instrumentalizing this stance and convincing Turkey to listen will
be more difficult. Turkish society has a long tradition of blaming Washington
for its problems, but persistent conspiracy theories about American involvement
in the coup could push the United States too far.
The most immediate issue is the question of Gulen's extradition. In general, the
U.S. extradition process has three steps: (1) the administration reviews the
request to ensure it meets bilateral treaty requirements, (2) U.S. courts
process the case in accordance with the American legal system, and (3) the
person is sent to the requesting country to stand trial in its legal system. The
challenge that Washington faces in Gulen's case is that Turkish authorities have
been playing fast and loose with the authority of their court system,
undermining the legitimacy of extradition requests. And even if the request is
legitimate on paper, U.S. courts and administration officials will have to weigh
whether Gulen would truly receive a free trial if he is sent to Turkey. From a
policy perspective, the administration would likely be better off swallowing its
concerns, sending this case to the courts, and letting the judicial system reach
a decision. In this delicate phase of relations with such an important ally,
realpolitik must guide the handling of such matters.