Obama’s
Legacy, a Nuclear Iran?
By
Emily Landau
Middle East Quarterly
Spring
2017
There is little doubt that Barack Obama
deems the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 2015 to be his
crowning foreign policy achievement and an important pillar of his presidential
legacy. To his mind, the deal is a shining nonproliferation success story
achieved via peaceful diplomacy and an important catalyst to improving
decades-long, moribund U.S.-Iranian relations.
But, Obama's assessment is wrong. The
JCPOA has many flaws and weaknesses, and it is important to assess the
president's role in the process that produced this dubious deal: What happened
on the ground; how Obama's perceptions of nuclear disarmament colored his
attitudes toward Iran, and the tactics he used to marginalize criticism and
mobilize support for a flawed deal at the domestic level. It is equally
important to examine to what lengths the president went in order to protect his
problematic deal after it was presented, and at what cost. What legacy on Iran
has Obama left for the next administration?
The Road to the JCPOA
In early April 2009, shortly after
entering the White House, Obama made his first major foreign policy speech in
Prague where he unveiled his agenda for advancing the goal of global nuclear
disarmament.[1] While
his initial steps in this direction were taken primarily at the global level,[2] in
autumn 2009—after Tehran had been caught red-handed constructing a hidden
enrichment facility at Fordow[3]—Obama
made his first attempt to conclude a partial nuclear agreement with Iran in the
context of a "fuel deal" offered by the five permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council and Germany (P5+1). The offer was that 75-80 percent of
Iran's then-stockpile of low enriched uranium would be shipped abroad and turned
into the fuel plates that the Iranians said they needed to run the civilian
Tehran Research Reactor.[4]
The offer was purposely designed to
test whether Tehran was exclusively focused on civilian nuclear activities as it
emphatically insisted—a claim the West did not believe and for which it
demanded "proof" via Iranian action.[5] Yet
while Tehran rejected the deal and failed the U.S. test, the administration
persisted in its efforts to engage the determined proliferator. Although Obama
did move to ramp up sanctions significantly on Tehran in 2010 after the deal was
rejected—a process that culminated with the biting sanctions of 2012[6]—the
bad faith displayed by Iran in the nuclear realm hardly resonated with an
administration that was bent on diplomacy. The tendency to try to prove Tehran's
intransigence, only to continue the talks after such proof was
provided—including agreeing to more concessions—is a dynamic that was also
to reappear in later stages of the negotiations. Maintaining diplomacy, which
began as a means to an end (i.e., stopping Iran's quest for nuclear weapons),
gradually became an end in itself. This provided an important lesson for Tehran
when negotiations began in earnest in 2013.
After securing an interim deal, or
Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), in late November 2013, negotiations on a final and
comprehensive nuclear deal began in January 2014. Up until 2013, the P5+1 had
sought to dismantle Iran's nuclear infrastructure—except perhaps for an
extremely limited and mainly symbolic enrichment program of no more than 1,500
centrifuges—and to deny it the ability to develop nuclear weapons. However, by
2014, the P5+1 negotiators had deemed this goal unattainable and settled instead
for the much watered-down aim: merely lengthening Tehran's breakout time from
several months to a year while leaving much of its nuclear infrastructure
intact.[7]
Many of the P5+1's red-lines
regarding the dismantlement of Iran's nuclear infrastructure disappeared
altogether. |
Moreover, they agreed to lift the
restrictions in ten to fifteen years regardless of any change in Iran's
interests or behavior. Initial concessions, such as agreeing not to discuss
ballistic missiles, opened the door to further compromises, all in an effort to
keep Tehran at the negotiating table. The red-lines regarding the dismantlement
of Iran's nuclear infrastructure turned pink, and many disappeared altogether.
This included the number of centrifuges left spinning (originally 1,500, then
4,000, finally 6,000). Furthermore, the centrifuges were not dismantled but
rather mothballed; the Fordow facility was left running; research and
development was enabled into a full range of advanced centrifuges; and the
demand for inspections of suspicious activities "any place, any time"
turned into a much longer and ambiguous process. Indeed, the hard-gained
leverage of the biting sanctions that brought the Iranians to the table was
gradually squandered in a process where Washington projected greater eagerness
for a deal than Tehran.
What's in the JCPOA Deal?
With the July 2015 JCPOA, Obama proudly
claimed to have severed every pathway to Iranian nuclear weapons, thus
preventing Tehran from obtaining such capability. He further emphasized that the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have access to any suspicious
facility "where necessary, when necessary."[8] But
a closer examination of the nuclear deal reveals that it does not uphold these
sweeping assertions. Rather, the agreement contains major concessions that
undermine the deal's effectiveness as well as including ambiguities that will no
doubt be abused by Tehran to advance its nuclear program. Briefly, the major
weaknesses and flaws of the deal, both technical and political, include the
following issues.[9]
Tehran
can continue its uranium enrichment operations while perfecting its
techniques and doing away with excess amounts. |
Iran's uranium
enrichment program. Not only did the JCPOA depart from the goal of eliminating
Tehran's enrichment program—leaving it with 6,000 centrifuges—but it
actually legitimized the program by allowing continued enrichment under the
terms of the deal. The agreement stipulates that Iran's stockpile of low
enriched uranium must not exceed 300 kg, but Tehran can continue its enrichment
operations while perfecting its techniques and doing away with excess amounts.
Moreover, the deal enables Iran to continue research and development on an
entire range of advanced generations of centrifuges, which will be far more
efficient than its current IR-1 centrifuges and which Tehran plans to begin
operating by the thousands from year eleven of the deal.[10]
Inspections and
verification. According to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the
IAEA is allowed access only to declared nuclear sites but has no inspection
rights at military facilities. In Iran's case, this meant that inspectors could
not demand entry to Parchin where Tehran was carrying out its illegal military
nuclear activities. By way of closing this loophole, the JCPOA was meant to
ensure "any time, any place" inspection rights for the IAEA.
In reality, however, the deal fails to
secure timely access despite Obama's claim to the contrary. According to one
reading, the JCPOA ensures that Tehran will have to agree to a requested
inspection at a suspicious military facility within twenty-four days (which in
some cases could be too long a wait for the inspectors). But looking more
carefully at the wording in relevant sections reveals that Tehran can use
different excuses to prolong that timeline before the 24-day clock even begins
ticking.[11] In
light of Tehran's continued insistence that it will never allow entry to its
military facilities,[12] any
demand for inspection is bound to spark a major confrontation. The regime can be
expected to do everything within its power to delay and bar entry, building on
the ambiguity in the JCPOA text.
An additional problem relates to
possible military work conducted at a facility outside Iran with North Korea
being the most obvious suspect. Cooperation between Tehran and Pyongyang in the
non-conventional realms, including the nuclear sphere, has been tracked for
years.[13] It
would make perfect strategic sense for Iran to try to outsource some of its
nuclear activities to North Korea, and it is not clear how closely this issue is
being monitored. Pyongyang's work on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)
is also of great concern. Any in-formation would have to rely on state
intelligence as North Korea abandoned the NPT in 2003.[14]
Iran's past
military work. The
entire case for confronting Tehran's nuclear ambitions hinges on its persistent
violation of the NPT—both the safeguard agreements with the IAEA when it
failed to notify the agency about nuclear facilities under construction at
Natanz, Arak, and later Fordow, and, more significantly, its work on a military
nuclear program. But the negotiations curiously did not include clarification of
lingering questions about the "possible military dimensions" (PMD) of
Iran's program; in fact, the P5+1 instructed the IAEA investigation in this
regard to be carried out in the months after the JCPOA was announced.
In early December 2015, despite
Tehran's continued lack of cooperation, the IAEA published the results of its
investigation confirming that the Iranians had worked on a military program
until 2003 and, in a less coordinated manner, until at least 2009.[15] But
in response, the P5+1 shelved the report and moved to implementation day. These
states never pushed back against Tehran's claim of "nuclear innocence"
(i.e., that it has never worked on a military nuclear program), which it
maintains to date. Continued international acquiescence in this blatant
falsehood gave rise to suspicions that this could have been pre-agreed to with
Tehran, possibly even in the context of the secret U.S.-Iranian negotiations in
Oman in 2013[16] though
there is no hard evidence of such an understanding. What is clear, however, is
that Tehran's narrative of innocence is anything but innocent; rather it has
been a commonly used Iranian ploy to reinforce its claim to have been unjustly
singled out for "illegal" sanctions and to demand that it be treated
as a "normal" member of the NPT, including the right to
confidentiality in its dealings with the IAEA.
Dealing with a
future violation. The JCPOA lacks decision-making guidance for dealing with
Iranian violations beyond mention of the so-called "snapback
sanctions." What kind of violations would be significant enough to elicit
such a response, and what are the criteria for their determination? Who must
agree and in what timeframe? What should be done, and who will do it? These are
all questions that will take time to answer and agree upon; failing to address
them in advance risks granting Iran valuable time to race to breakout. On the
snapback sanctions, to state the obvious, they do not snap back on their own but
rather are reinstated by states, which must decide which sanctions will be
reinstated and under which conditions. All these issues require further
deliberation and decisions, and there is no indication that they have been
tackled.
Sunset provisions.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the JCPOA are the sunset provisions,
whereby restrictions on Iran will be lifted in ten to fifteen years regardless
of Tehran's behavior or demonstrated regional and nuclear ambitions and
interests. Without indication of a strategic U-turn in its nuclear outlook,
there is no reason to assume that in ten to fifteen years Tehran will not go
back to doing precisely what it was doing before the deal was reached. Moreover,
it will be doing so from a far more advantageous starting point after having
built up an industrial-sized enrichment program. It is important to note that
the counterargument whereby many arms control agreements, such as those between
the United States and Russia, have termination dates is irrelevant to the JCPOA
for the simple reason that it is not a political arrangement between two nuclear
powers but rather an agreement between an NPT violator, Iran, and the
international com-munity aimed at bringing it back to the fold of the treaty.
Until the violator indicates that it has altered its nuclear ambitions, there is
no justification for sunset. The sunset provision is another instance which
high-lights why Tehran insists on its narrative of nuclear innocence: It helped
justify the Iranian demand for an unconditional expiration date. If Tehran's
proven past record of violating the NPT had been at the forefront of the debate,
it would have been obvious why the JCPOA could not reasonably be terminated
without the Iranians meeting certain benchmarks.
Obama's View on Nuclear Disarmament
and Iran
From the start, and flowing from
Obama's nuclear disarmament agenda, the rationale and strategy for dealing with
Iran's nuclear ambitions were ill-conceived. To begin, Obama believed that the
great powers must come with "clean hands" when confronting Tehran,[17] thus
linking the goal of stopping determined proliferators to global disarmament. But
this link is misguided, not least because Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons was
a blatant violation of the NPT whereas the treaty sets no deadline for nuclear
states' disarmament. Moreover, Tehran was pursuing its own nuclear goals, and
these were not at all connected to whether the nuclear powers were disarming or
not. But Obama's belief that Washington was on shaky moral ground vis-à-vis
Tehran at least partially explains his overly lenient attitude on some key
issues, such as conceding to Iran's demand not to include ballistic missiles in
the nuclear negotiations and insisting on not publicly "shaming"
Tehran by emphasizing its deceitful past behavior in the nuclear realm.
Nor was the close connection between
Tehran's nuclear aspirations and its regional ambitions well-integrated into
Obama's thinking and policy. And while there were good reasons for not
attempting a "grand bargain" with Iran encompassing a wide range of
issues,[18] which
would have undoubtedly complicated and prolonged the negotiations, it was a
mistake to think that the nuclear issue could be neatly separated from other
aspects of Iranian behavior. Ironically, Obama implicitly validated this linkage
by implying that the nuclear deal could lead to a more moderate Iran and
improved bilateral relations. What he refused to accept, however, is the flip
side. Namely, that absent such a change, the intimate connection between
Tehran's military nuclear ambitions and its overall hegemonic aspirations could
not be ignored and should have led Washington to resist firmly any sunset
provisions before a strategic U-turn could be discerned. Otherwise, the most
that could be achieved—in the best-case scenario—is a delay in Iran's plans
after which it could pick up where it left off.
Obama wanted a deal with Iran, and it
seemed that he willed it at almost any cost. |
Complicating matters considerably was
Obama's desire to mend fences with all U.S. enemies, a theme he set forth in his
inaugural speech in 2009: the famous "outstretched hand" in return for
the "unclenched fist."[19] The
president wanted a deal with Iran, and in the latter stages, it seemed that he
willed it at almost any cost. He appeared unwilling to give up this goal, which
brought together the twin aims of rolling back nuclear capabilities and
befriending a major enemy of the United States. Some have suggested an even more
far-reaching strategic aim that guided Obama's dealings with Tehran from the
start: the desire to fundamentally restructure U.S. relations with the Middle
East in a manner that would place Iran, rather than traditional U.S. allies, at
the core of the new regional architecture.[20]
Marginalizing Criticism of the Deal
Given that Obama wanted a nuclear
deal—seemingly at almost every cost—it is hardly surprising that the
heavy-handed manner by which his administration promoted the JCPOA and
delegitimized any and all criticism of its substance has become an integral part
of his legacy.
In the early stages of the
negotiations, Obama had frequently reiterated the maxim that "no deal is
better than a bad deal" in an attempt to reassure skeptics that he would
not accept an unsatisfactory arrangement. Al-though he resisted defining what
would constitute a bad deal, it was believed that he was adamant about not being
out-maneuvered by Tehran. But as he began to demonstrate an increasingly firm
commitment to achieving a negotiated agreement, it seemed that this slogan was
being replaced by another, whereby "almost any deal would be better than no
deal." This was about the same time that the administration began stressing
to the American public that the only alternative to the emerging deal—which
clearly failed to fulfill the original nonproliferation goals set by the
ad-ministration itself—was war.
The
choice between the deal and war was never an accurate depiction of
reality: It was a political argument. |
By misrepresenting the choice between
the JCPOA and war as a statement of fact, the administration sought to depict
anyone who voiced reservations or criticism of the deal as a warmonger, which is
how critics were regularly labeled.[21] But
the choice between diplomacy and war was never an accurate depiction of reality:
It was a political argument. In fact, what many, if not most of the critics were
advocating—in the months leading up to the deal—was not to end negotiations
and resort to other means but rather to use the economic leverage more wisely in
order to get a better deal at the negotiating table. Washington would have done
well to call Tehran's bluff when it threatened to leave the talks because the
Iranians would not have left for long. Indeed, the only way to get sanctions
lifted—which is what brought Tehran to the negotiating table in the first
place—was to continue negotiating. Moreover, Washington's demonstrated
eagerness for a deal was clearly undermining its leverage. Had more
sophisticated bargaining techniques been employed, a better deal could most
likely have been achieved. But by turning critics into despicable hawks itching
for a war, the message was that their advice should be ignored altogether.
The administration used other tactics
to silence critics. It falsely claimed that opponents had no idea what was going
on in the negotiating room, hence, had to await the conclusion of the deal in
order to be familiarized with its actual details. However, there were media
reports along the way that reflected much of what transpired in the
negotiations—especially regarding the concessions being made to Iran. When the
JCPOA was announced, it was clear that the reports had been accurate. But the
minute the JCPOA was announced, critics were told that their criticism had been
rendered irrelevant because it was a done deal. This manipulative messaging
policy obviously left no room for voicing legitimate and potentially useful
critique of the negotiations and the nascent deal—it was either too early or
too late.
In selling the deal to the American
public, the administration pushed additional political positions as statements
of fact. A good example is the claim that there was no risk in giving the deal a
chance since even if Tehran were to violate it, or to wait it out, Washington
would always have the same options (i.e., military force) that it had had when
negotiations began. But this is not necessarily true, and the statement reflects
a poor understanding of international politics where options and opportunities
can easily change over time. Even today, one can see how Russia's increased and
active role in the Middle East, cooperating closely with Iran in the military
campaign in Syria, can greatly complicate the calculus of a military strike
against Tehran down the line, as compared to previous years. In future years,
such a strike could risk escalation not only with Iran, but with Russia as well.
By 2015, there was an accelerated
campaign to suppress and squelch any criticism that might have led to a better
deal, and the "echo chamber" that was devised for this purpose was
later described by none other than Ben Rhodes, Obama's deputy national security
adviser for strategic communications, during in-depth interviews with The
New York Times.[22] Lawmakers
such as Sen. Robert Menendez (Dem., N.J.)—a long-time, outspoken critic of the
negotiations and deal—were directly derided by the administration for their
critique.[23] The
echo chamber tactics were particularly intense during the summer 2015
congressional debate on the JCPOA, which together with the special voting
procedure set by the administration, resulted in the deal not being toppled by
Congress.
Israel's objection to the deal—voiced
loudly and clearly by Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu—presented a
particular challenge for Obama, resulting in great effort to frame the prime
minister as the odd man out on the issue. He was depicted as an unwavering
rejectionist to any deal with Iran and as out of step with the international
community. When Netanyahu persisted in his criticism, culminating in his
controversial speech to Congress in March 2015,[24] his
relations with Obama almost reached a boiling point, and all bets were off as
far as the administration was concerned. One new tactic was to delve into the
internal Israeli scene and to frame Netanyahu not only as the odd man out vis-à-vis
the world but also with Israel's defense establishment, which the Obama
administration claimed actually supported the deal.[25] In
contrast to Netanyahu's speech—which was politically problematic and which
many considered unwise but accurate in its content—the administration's claim
was spurious and unfounded. The actual range of opinion voiced in Israel was
much more varied and nuanced, necessitating more sophisticated analysis, but it
never amounted to "Netanyahu vs. the defense/security establishment"
regarding assessments of the negotiations, and certainly not with regard to the
merits of the deal itself.[26]
The First Year of Implementation
As misconceived and problematic as the
JCPOA is, developments in the first year of its implementation have rendered the
situation even worse. This is reflected in a string of revelations about
additional concessions made to Tehran as well as the particular manner in which
U.S.-Iranian interactions have unfolded over this period.
Deception and
distortion revealed. Part of Obama's legacy regarding the Iran nuclear deal is no
doubt the deception and distortion, revealed in 2016, which the administration
employed about certain aspects of the JCPOA and related events. Two issues in
particular deserve mention: Tehran's enrichment plans from the eleventh year of
the deal, and the $1.7 billion paid to it, ostensibly to settle a pre-Islamic
Revolution debt from the days of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
Tehran
plans to begin operating advanced generation centrifuges, many times more
efficient than the centrifuges currently in use. |
Information with regard to Iran's
enrichment plans for year eleven was first published by Associated Press (AP) in
July 2016,[27] which
revealed that Tehran plans to install and begin operating 2,500-3,500 advanced
generation centrifuges that will be many times more efficient than the IR-1
centrifuges currently in use. This development would shorten the time required
to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear weapon to six months.
This information was hidden from public view when the deal was presented and in
the subsequent congressional debate and revealed only a year later. Worse, this
lack of transparency was thereafter explained by the common practice among NPT
member states to conclude confidential arrangements with the IAEA, ignoring the
fact that as an NPT violator, there was no justification for granting Iran
privileges enjoyed by NPT members in good standing.
Moreover, the AP revelation was a
reminder of an interview granted by Obama to NPR in April 2015, in which, when
referring to the emerging deal, he noted that "a more relevant fear [than
hoarding uranium] would be that in year 13, 14, 15, [Iran has] advanced
centrifuges that enrich uranium fairly rapidly, and at that point the breakout
times would have shrunk almost down to zero."[28] This
statement sparked immediate attention because it confirmed the fears that
critics had been voicing about Tehran's ability in the not too distant future to
rush quickly to develop a nuclear bomb. But in a press conference, then-acting
spokesperson for the State Department, Marie Harf, flatly denied the
implication, claiming instead that Obama was referring to the scenario of no
deal. However, the president's interview had been filmed, and it was obvious
that he alluded to the scenario of a deal.[29] The
information on Iran's enrichment plans that was finally revealed in July 2016 is
clearly the basis for Obama's earlier statement and assessment, underlining the
secrecy, deception and distortion that characterized this episode.
The money transfer episode of January
2016 offered a similarly disturbing illustration of the administration's
deceptive conduct. The original story was that the JCPOA's implementation day
was followed by two parallel and unrelated events: the release of four (but not
all) American prisoners held in Iran on bogus charges and the return of money
paid by the shah for an arms deal that was aborted after the Islamic Revolution. The
Wall Street Journal revealed that there not only was a clear linkage
between the two events but that the $400 million transferred in January had been
paid in hard cash in line with Tehran's demand,[30] leading
many to conclude that the administration had in effect paid Tehran ransom for
releasing the prisoners, in contravention of long-standing U.S. policy.
No pushback
against Iran's provocations. Since the JCPOA was adopted, Tehran has been testing the
international community's readiness to respond to provocations. Iranian supreme
leader Ali Khamene'i has been clear about rejecting any form of cooperation with
the United States, and during 2016, Washington was repeatedly (and falsely)
accused of not upholding its end of the deal.[31]
Other Iranian provocations included
testing precision-guided ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear
payload in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and stepping up
military intervention in Syria—in cooperation with Russia—with the aim of
keeping Bashar al-Assad in power. All indications are that rather than the
nuclear deal promoting Iranian moderation and opening the door to new
opportunities for cooperation, Washington and Tehran are still engaged in a
fierce struggle, at least as far as the Iranians are concerned.
Specifically on the nuclear file,
Iran's compliance has not been stellar, and while the violations have thus far
been relatively minor, the Obama administration has not rebuked Tehran and has
rather adamantly defended its supposed compliance with the JCPOA, citing IAEA
reports on Iran at every turn. But, following the November 2016 IAEA report,
David Albright, a leading nuclear proliferation expert and head of the Institute
for Science and International
Security, noted that for the second
time, Tehran had exceeded the limit of heavy water production and was
con-ducting activities related to IR-6 advanced centrifuges, which may not be
allowed by the JCPOA.[32] Since
then, it has been reported that Iran is also set to begin injecting gas into
IR-8 centrifuges, meaning they are beginning to test them, on the way to making
them operational.[33]
These Iranian actions have been matched
by Washington's lack of response. Indeed, in every instance, the administration
rushed to provide reassurances that whatever transpired was of no real
consequence and that there was no reason for concern. This whitewashing even
extended to German intelligence released in 2016 indicating that, throughout
2015, Tehran had continued attempts to illicitly procure technologies and
components that could be used in a nuclear weapons program.[34] The
administration's thinking in all of these cases seemed to have been that it
could not risk upsetting Tehran in any way because this might cause the Iranians
to abort the deal. But Iran most likely would not have left the JCPOA since the
deal is not unfavorable from its point of view. The result of Obama's bending
over backward has been a dangerous shift in the balance of deterrence between
the two states in Tehran's favor, leaving the Trump administration with the
daunting task of regaining the upper hand in dealing with Iran and reassuming
lost leadership, authority, and power.
Conclusion
Obama
leaves the Middle East a far more dangerous place than it was eight years
ago. |
Having orchestrated a deeply flawed
nuclear deal, Obama leaves the Middle East a far more dangerous place than it
was eight years ago. Not merely because the JCPOA opens the door to the
terrifying prospect of a nuclear Iran within ten to fifteen years, and perhaps
even sooner, but because the administration enabled an emboldened Iran to emerge
over the course of 2015-16, unchallenged by Washington. In fact, while
negotiating the deal, the U.S. president was already helping to transform the
Islamic Republic, with its extremist, hegemonic agenda, into the region's
preeminent power at the expense of traditional U.S. allies. For example, despite
Obama's pretense to be focused exclusively on the nuclear issue by way of
securing the JCPOA, Jay Solomon of The Wall Street Journal argues
that the president resisted upholding the redline he had set with regard to
Assad's use of chemical weapons due to a warning issued by Tehran: If the U.S.
resorted to military force in Syria, it could scuttle the nuclear negotiations.
Obama continued to shun the Syrian crisis to his final days in office so as not
to upset Tehran and risk rattling the nascent nuclear deal.[35] According
to this interpretation of events, Washington left Syria to Iran (and Russia) in
return for the nuclear deal, a tradeoff that the administration denies.
Sadly, the American public remained
largely oblivious to these blunders as the administration's echo chamber
strategy proved extremely effective with most pundits—except a few very
notable exceptions—expressing unmitigated support for the JCPOA in line with
administration talking points and positions. The arms control and
nonproliferation community, which should have been at the forefront of the
debate, pointing out all the deal's weaknesses and potential pitfalls, was in
the main uncritically lured by the administration's propaganda. On a broader
level, Obama's heavy-handed delegitimization of any and all criticism and his
aggressive pushing of the deal in Congress have left domestic political scars,
including among Democrats, that add to the president's dismal Iranian legacy.
Obama's only achievement lies in
kicking the nuclear can down the road to future administrations. But he created
a reality in which it will be far more difficult to stop Iran down that road.
With its nuclear program legitimized by the JCPOA, Tehran is much better poised
to forge ahead at a time of its choosing. For contrary to Obama's emphatic
statements, the JCPOA does not end Tehran's nuclear ambitions, nor has it lived
up to the president's hope of ushering in a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations.
The challenge for the Trump
administration is to try to reverse some of these negative trends. In making the
best of a bad situation, the preferred route at this point—after Tehran has
already pocketed billions of dollars—would be neither to renounce the deal nor
try to renegotiate it but, rather, to enforce it strictly as well as strengthen
its provisions. Much can be achieved by reversing the Obama administration's
approach to Iran—recognizing Tehran's overt hostility to U.S. interests and
responding with firm determination to its provocations beyond the direct context
of the JCPOA.
These, however, are but general
guidelines for future U.S. policy on this issue. After the damage wrought by the
Obama administration, the road ahead will be strewn with difficulties, and there
are no shortcuts or magic solutions for redressing the situation.