The
Peace Process is an Obstacle to Peace
By Michael
Mandelbaum
Commentary Magazine
April 14, 2016
The American presidency has accumulated a number of
traditions that anyone holding the office is expected to perpetuate. Examples
include delivering the State of the Union address to Congress, lighting the
national Christmas tree, and presiding over the Israeli–Palestinian peace
process. The next president will no doubt continue all three. If he or she
follows the pattern established by the most recent incumbents, however, the
result of the peace process will be failure. Indeed, the continuation of the
peace process as it has been practiced will not simply be futile: It will be
positively harmful. The conduct of the peace process has made peace less likely.
If it is to continue at all, a fundamental change in the American approach is
needed.
Successive administrations have failed at the peace process
because they have not understood—or not admitted to themselves—the nature of
the conflict they have been trying to resolve. In the eyes of the American
officials engaged in this long-running endeavor, making peace has been akin to a
labor negotiation. Each side, they have believed, has desired a resolution, and
the task of the United States has been to find a happy medium, a set of
arrangements that both sides could accept. In fact, each side has wanted the
conflict to end, but in radically different and indeed incompatible ways that
have made a settlement impossible: The Israelis have wanted peace; the
Palestinians have wanted the destruction of Israel.
At the core of the conflict, standing out like a skyscraper
in a desert to anyone who cared to notice, is the Palestinian refusal to accept
Jewish sovereignty in the Middle East. This attitude has existed for at least a
century, since the Arab rejection of the Balfour Declaration in 1917. While much
has changed in the region over those 10 decades, the conflict’s fundamental
cause has not. The Palestinians’ position is expressed in their devotion to
what has come to be called incitement: incessant derogatory propaganda about
Jews and Israel, the denial of any historical Jewish connection to Jerusalem and
its environs, and the insistence that all the territory between the Jordan River
and the Mediterranean Sea belongs to the Arabs, making the Jews living there, in
the Palestinian view, contemptible interlopers to be killed or evicted. The
Palestinians’ attitude has expressed itself, as well, in their negotiators’
refusal either to accept any proposal for terminating the conflict or to offer
any counterproposals of their own. The goal of eliminating Israel also lies
behind Palestinian officials’ glorification as “martyrs” of those who
murder Israeli civilians, giving their families financial rewards to encourage
such killings.
American officials have either ignored or downplayed all of
this. They have never emphasized its centrality to the conflict, instead
focusing on Israeli control of the West Bank of the Jordan River, which the
Israeli army captured from Jordan in the 1967 War and on which Israel has built
towns, villages, and settlements. American officials have regarded the
“occupation,” as the international community has chosen to call it, of the
West Bank as the cause of the ongoing conflict. In fact, the reverse is true. It
is the persistence of the conflict that keeps Israel in the West Bank. A
majority of Israelis believes that retaining control of all of the territory
brings high costs but that turning it over entirely to Palestinian control,
given the virulent Palestinian hostility to their very existence, would incur
even higher costs. A withdrawal, they have every reason to believe, would create
a vacuum that anti-Israel terrorist groups would fill. Ample precedent supports
this view: When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon and Gaza, two terrorist
organizations—Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza—took control of the
vacated territories and proceeded to launch attacks against the Jewish state.
While sometimes acknowledging in private that it would not
bring peace, American peace processers have in the past nonetheless justified
continuing the peace process on the grounds that it served American interests by
making it possible to have good relations with Arab governments while at the
same time sustaining close ties with Israel. According to this rationale, the
Americans could tell the Arab rulers, and those rulers could tell their
fervently anti-Zionist publics, that the United States was, after all, working
to address their grievances.
In fact, the conflict never had the importance for
Arab–American relations claimed for it. The Arab leaders determined their
actual policies, toward the United States and toward other countries, on the
basis of their own interests, above all their common interest in remaining in
power, which seldom had anything to do with Israel. Now, however, with civil
wars raging across the region, with the United States drawing back from the
Middle East, and with their archenemy Iran becoming increasingly powerful, Arab
leaders have dropped even the pretense that the conflict between Israelis and
Palestinians matters greatly to them.
The peace process has therefore become unnecessary for the
United States, even by the reasoning that sustained it in the past. In its
familiar form it is, however, worse than that. It has caused real damage and
will continue to do so if not fundamentally changed. In fact, the American
conduct of the peace process bears an unhappy resemblance to the custom of
treating diseases by placing leeches on the body of the afflicted person: It was
based on an inadequate understanding of the pathology it attempted to cure, it
did not solve the problem it was intended to fix, and it sometimes made it
substantially worse.
The orthodox approach to the peace process has harmed
American interests by wasting the most valuable commodity the American
government possesses: the time of its senior officials. It has done harm as well
by diverting attention from the real cause of the conflict—the Palestinian
refusal to accept the legitimacy and permanence of Israel—thereby reducing the
already small chance of ending it. Worst of all, the peace process has actually
obstructed a settlement of the conflict by supporting—unintentionally—the
current Palestinian strategy for eliminating the Jewish state.
The next administration should tell the truth about the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict: namely, that the responsibility for creating and
perpetuating it rests with the Palestinian side.
The current Palestinian strategy is the third since the
founding of Israel. The first, which began with Israel’s declaration of
independence in 1948, involved frontal attacks by Arab forces with the goals of
conquest, occupation, and annihilation. It collapsed with the resounding defeat
of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies in June 1967. The second strategy
relied on terrorism, with the goal of demoralizing all Israeli citizens, leading
ultimately to the implosion of their society. Although terrorism continues, it,
too, has failed: Israel has become an island of social solidarity, political
stability, and economic dynamism in a region where other countries lack all
three.
In recent years, therefore, the Palestinians and their
allies have adopted a third strategy: delegitimation. They have sought to
portray Israel as a neocolonial power that practices the kind of discrimination
that characterized apartheid-era South Africa. The Boycott, Divestment, and
Sanctions Movement is the most visible instrument of this strategy, the
proponents of which seek to turn Israel into an international pariah and thus
weaken it, economically at first and ultimately fatally.
This strategy will also fail, not least because the charges
it levels are false. Nonetheless, the peace process has given the champions of
the strategy of delegitimation reason to believe that it can work. The
Palestinian authorities, led first by Yasir Arafat and now by Mahmoud Abbas,
have managed to ensure the failure of all negotiations with Israel by their
intransigence while at the same time avoiding responsibility for that failure.
Successive American administrations have refrained from telling the
world—clearly, emphatically, and repeatedly—precisely why the peace process
has never succeeded. The Obama administration has in fact blamed Israel. By
failing to rebut the false narrative about the fate of the peace process and,
even worse, by occasionally propagating it, the American government has
reinforced the strategy of delegitimation and made the faint chances of settling
the conflict even fainter.
By flooding the country with people hostile to it, finally,
the result of implementing the Palestinian “right of return” would be the
destruction of Israel.
What, then, should the next administration do? It would
improve on its predecessor’s performance by abandoning the peace process
entirely. If, however, as history suggests is likely, it insists on following in
the footsteps of the last seven administrations and pursuing a peace process, it
should make two fundamental changes in how the United States conducts it. First,
it should tell the truth about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: namely, that
the responsibility for creating and perpetuating it rests with the Palestinian
side. Peace requires that the Palestinians accept international law: Israel is a
legitimate, internationally recognized sovereign state. It requires that they
accept international custom: Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people,
and the nation-state is the standard form of political organization in the
world. And peace requires that the Palestinians accept the norms of common
decency and common sense: The Jews have the same right to sovereignty as any
other people. Peace, that is, requires a fundamental change of attitude on the
part of the Palestinians, nothing less.
Negotiations will be fruitless at best without such a transformation, which
raises the question of how to know that it has taken place. This leads to the
second change the next administration should make in the peace process if it
insists on continuing it. The next president should make it a condition for
resuming negotiations that the Palestinians renounce their so-called right of
return.
They have insisted that, as part of any settlement, all the
descendants of the 400,000 Arabs who fled what became Israel in 1948, a group
that they assert numbers several million people, be allowed to settle in Israel.
As well as entirely impractical, the demand is morally ludicrous. The original
refugees left because of a war started by the Arabs, not the Israelis. The new
Israeli government even urged them to stay; Arab leaders told them to leave,
promising that they would return after the anticipated destruction of the new
state. The demand also has no historical precedent. The 20th century saw other
such large-scale flights—of Hindus from Pakistan and Muslims from India at the
time of the partition of South Asia in 1947, for example, and of Jews from Arab
countries, who were expelled, in many cases from places where their ancestors
had lived for centuries, in numbers comparable to if not greater than the total
number of Arabs who left the new Israel in 1948. In no case was the country the
refugees had abandoned expected to take them back.
Nor does the “right of return” have any basis in
international law. The Palestinians assert that it stems from United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948. That resolution, while devoted chiefly
to other matters, included a paragraph suggesting the return of all
refugees—implicitly including Jews who had resided in Arab countries—to
their original homes. It was not drafted to be mandatory and was never intended
to have the force of law. The Arab governments never made any effort to extend
such a “right” to Jews who had had to flee their countries and, in any
event, did not vote for the resolution when it came before the General Assembly.
This Palestinian demand is in fact an assault on the
sovereignty of the Jewish state and thus part of the century-old campaign
against Zionism. It asserts that Israel should not be allowed to exercise the
fundamental, indeed defining, prerogative of sovereignty—the control of its
own borders. It would also deny to Israel another sovereign prerogative,
deciding who has the right to citizenship. By flooding the country with people
hostile to it, finally, the result of implementing the Palestinian “right of
return” would be the destruction of Israel, which is surely the reason that
the Palestinians insist on it.
In peace-process orthodoxy, the “refugee problem” is
classified as one of the “final status” issues—problems so difficult that
they can be addressed only after all the easier ones have been resolved. In
fact, the insistence on a “right of return” assures that negotiations will
fail, and thus should not be started in the first place, because they amount to
the Palestinian insistence on achieving what is not negotiable: Israel’s
disappearance.
If and when the Palestinians do signal their acceptance of Israel by abandoning
this claim, it will become possible to address the issues that do require
negotiation: the border between Israel and a Palestinian state, which may well
require uprooting some Jewish settlements to the east of Israel’s eastern
border of 1967, and the disposition of military forces between the new border
and the Jordan River. As long, however, as the Palestinians make clear, by
asserting their “right of return,” that they refuse to live peacefully side
by side with a Jewish state, negotiations are at best a waste of time and at
worst a way of perpetuating the conflict by encouraging the Palestinians to
persist in their goal of eliminating Israel.
To be sure, the two necessary changes to the American approach to the peace process will not, in and of themselves, bring peace. Only the abandonment of the fundamental Palestinian attitude to Israel can do that; and the United States does not have the power to transform that attitude. The changes would, however, have desirable consequences. They would discourage the strategy of delegitimation by making it clear that the United States rejects the strategy’s premises, which would in turn reduce, although not eliminate, the constituency for that strategy in the United States and in the place where it is most popular, Europe. Reducing support for it would send to the Palestinians the message that, like a frontal military assault and terrorism, delegitimation will not succeed in destroying Israel. The two changes would also improve the moral tone of American foreign policy. Telling the truth about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict would affirm American support for international law, democracy, the peaceful resolution of international disputes, and the principle of equal rights for all peoples. It would also affirm American opposition to aggression and terrorism. It would, that is, put the United States—to use a term favored by recent administrations—on the right side of history.