The
Risk in Lifting Sanctions, and Pressure, on Iran’s Weapons Activities
Tehran's longstanding arms trafficking and missile research efforts highlight
the problem with wholesale removal of weapons restrictions.
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Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate
Armed Services Committee this month that "we should under no circumstances
relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms
trafficking." Yet under the Iran nuclear agreement announced last week and
endorsed Monday by the U.N. Security Council, sanctions on conventional arms are
to be lifted in five years and missile sanctions in eight years (possibly sooner
under certain conditions). And Iran appears to be making no promises to limit
its activities in either area.
The Obama administration has said that the negotiations aimed only to limit
Iran's nuclear activities and that sanctions targeting Iran's missile program
and arms trafficking were essentially punishments for non-compliance over
nuclear issues. It has also said that the terms of U.N. resolutions obligate the
international community to lift the arms and missile sanctions once a deal is
reached on Iran's nuclear program. Secretary of State John Kerry said Sunday
that the extension of arms and missile sanctions for five or eight years was
"thrown in as an add-on," as though they should be considered a win
for U.S. negotiators. But these arguments don't hold up.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 states two purposes in its preamble:
"to persuade Iran to comply...with the requirements of the IAEA" and
"to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of
its nuclear and missile programmes." In reports on Iran's noncompliance
with its nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations, the International Atomic
Energy Agency has included concerns related to missiles, such as Iran's
"studies...related to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle."
Iran has tried for more than a decade to have restrictions on conventional arms
and missiles lifted. A Jan. 17, 2005, proposal from Iran to France, Germany and
the UK demands that the restrictions be dropped; a counterproposal later that
year omitted the clause. The U.S. and its allies long considered Iran's nuclear
program, ballistic missiles, and proliferation activities part and parcel of a
single threat. The fear was not merely that Iran would develop fissile material
for a bomb but also that Iran would develop the means to deliver that bomb and
share sensitive technologies.
The notion that U.N. Security Council resolutions require Western allies to drop
the arms and missile sanctions is an unpersuasive theory. Iran did not comply
with these resolutions: It never satisfied the Security Council's core demand
that it suspend uranium enrichment. And the July 14 agreement does not require
Iran to meet the criteria the Security Council imposed for terminating
sanctions: that Iran has "fully complied with its obligations under the
relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the
IAEA Board of Governors."
The Obama administration may believe that a shift in standards was necessary to
reach agreement this month and avert an even worse outcome. But it makes little
sense to argue that we must hold ourselves to the letter of U.N. resolutions
while not holding Iran to the same.
All of this might be academic if Iranian missile activities and arms trafficking
did not pose such a threat to U.S. interests. Iran has the region's largest,
most advanced ballistic missile arsenal and is thought to be working on
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said this
month, "The reason that we want to stop Iran from having an ICBM program is
that 'I' in 'ICBM' stands for intercontinental, which means having the
capability of flying from Iran to the United States." Nuclear weapons
require delivery systems, which is why Iran's ballistic missile program would
appropriately be part of a nuclear accord.
Iranian arms trafficking to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and others threatens
stability in the Middle East. Hezbollah's attacks on Israel in 2006 were carried
out using Iranian rockets and missiles. Conflicts in Yemen, Gaza, and Syria are
fueled by Iranian arms, and such Iranian intervention feeds Sunni grievances
that benefit the likes of the Islamic State.
As Iran develops more advanced missiles and more sensitive nuclear technology,
these capabilities, too, could be shared. The U.S. does have other authorities
to interdict arms shipments to terrorist groups, as President Obama has noted.
But interdiction requires having intelligence and opportunity, and the latter
often involves depending on the will and capacity of Iran's neighbors to assist.
These tasks would be far easier if the arms are prohibited from reaching Iran in
the first place.
The Obama administration may feel that it had no choice but to accept the
phasing out of sanctions. But this argument should be made on its own merits.
The notion that we never sought such limits or were obligated to remove the
sanctions doesn't hold up. If the sanctions are fully lifted without Iran
pledging to cease or limit its arms trafficking and ballistic missile
activities, the next U.S. president will be left to find different options --
likely more forceful or less effective -- to counter Iranian behavior.