Why Iran Won’t Give Up Syria
By Jackson
Diehl
Washington
Post
August 2, 2015
With the Iran
nuclear deal in hand, President Obama appears ready to focus more of his
attention on stemming the wars, mass atrocities and humanitarian catastrophes
that have spread across the Middle East during his presidency. He has
articulated several big goals he wants to reach before the next president takes
office: to put the United States and its allies “on
track to defeat” the Islamic State; to “have
jump-started a process to resolve the civil war in Syria”; and to
defend Israel and other U.S. allies from aggression mounted by Iran and its
proxies.
Here’s the
problem: The last two of those goals are, as the president conceives them,
directly in conflict with each other.
At his post-deal
news conference last month, Obama conceded that Iran might use some
of the billions it will soon receive to supply the Lebanese Hezbollah militia
with fresh weapons, and he vowed to do his best to stop it. “It is in the
national security interest of the United States to prevent Iran from sending
weapons to Hezbollah,” he said.
At the same
time, Obama described the solution to the Syrian war as requiring an
“agreement among the major powers that are interested in Syria.” He added,
“Iran is one of those players, and I think that it’s important for them to
be part of that conversation.”
That remark
signaled a reverse of Obama’s previous policy of excluding Iran from Syrian
peace talks. At U.S. insistence, Tehran was left out of the two conferences held
in Geneva in 2012 and 2014. More important, conceding an Iranian say on Syria
contradicted Obama’s goal of stopping its support for Hezbollah. That’s
because Iran’s deep and so far unwavering support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad
is driven almost entirely by its use of Syria as a land bridge to the Shiite
militia.
Hezbollah
“is Iran’s aircraft carrier in the eastern Mediterranean,” says Robert
Ford, the former U.S. ambassador to Syria. The militia deploys tens of thousands
of missiles in southern Lebanon aimed at Israel, and it ensures that no
government in Lebanon can be formed without Tehran’s consent. Thousands of its
fighters are keeping the Assad regime standing in Damascus — not because of
any love for Assad’s Alawite sect but to preserve this link to Iran.
Lacking
reliable sea access to Lebanon, Iran needs control over the Damascus airport and
the border between Syria and Lebanon to ensure Hezbollah’s resupply. That’s
why, as it loses ground to rebels in the north and south, the Assad regime’s
army — itself now largely an Iranian proxy — has begun to concentrate on
defending a narrow strip of territory between Damascus and the border.
Ford and other
experts on Syria say Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will never
accept a settlement of the Syrian war that strands Hezbollah. To do so would be
to surrender Iran’s regional ambitions, including its ability to threaten
Israel. “Iran’s overall policy . . . is focused rigidly (in
Syria) on Hezbollah,” former State Department adviser Frederic Hof, now with
the Atlantic Council, wrote me.
So how to
agree with Khamenei on Syria’s future? “What are we supposed to do?” asks
Hof. “Help find an alternative to [Assad] who would work with Iran to keep
rockets and missiles pointed at Tel Aviv?”
To be sure,
Obama’s description of the prospects for diplomacy on Syria start not with
Iran but with Russia, the regime’s other principal backer. U.S. officials say
the president has had promising conversations with Vladimir Putin on Syria in
recent weeks. It’s at least possible to imagine the form a joint U.S.-Russian
settlement formula might take: Assad would be removed, allowing the non-jihadist
opposition to join with a new government in war against the Islamic State.
The problem,
as Hof points out, is that Russia lacks the leverage to bring about a change in
the Syrian leadership. The Assad regime is propped up almost entirely at this
point by money, weapons and fighters supplied by Iran. And Tehran, says Ford,
“is not ready to give up on Assad.” From the Iranian point of view, there is
no reason to abandon the regime unless it proves unable to hold Damascus and the
border zone. In the rest of the country, Shiite Iran is content — even happy
— to watch the Sunni Islamic State and Sunni Syrian rebel forces fight to the
death.
The bottom
line is that a serious effort to end Syria’s war will require Obama to choose
between challenging Iran’s Syrian land bridge to Hezbollah through more
vigorous support for anti-Assad forces, or accepting a settlement that tacitly
sanctions a continued Iranian proxy army on Israel’s border. Considering his
investment in the nuclear deal, it wouldn’t be surprising if he shrinks from
both options — and hands a Syrian nightmare to his successor.